





This paper studies the七rade credit ofChinese corporations．Previous studies have  
PreSentedvariousviews ontheutilizationoftrade credit．One studyarguedthatnon－  
State－OWned firms utilized more trade credit than state－OWned firms．Meanwhile，  
another studysuggestedthat non・State－OWnedfirms depended oninformalfinancing  
Channelsratherthanontrade credit．Whatis the actualfinancingpatternofChinese  
COrPOrations？To answer this question，We emPloy alarge database of Chinese  
COrPOrations andconductcomparative analysesbetweentwo groups：State－OWnedfirms  
andnon－S七ate・OWnedfirms．Statisticalinvestigations revealtwofindings．First，Our  





1．Int王・Oduction   
Thisstudyinvestigatesthe且nancingstructureofChinesecorporations．Inparticular，  
Wefocusontradecreditanddelineatethe丘nancingstruCture．Analysesontherelation  
between economic growth and the financialsystem focus on trade credit．Thisis  
because existing studies have reportedthatin developlng COuntries，Where financial  
intermediationbybanksis not mature，funds for economic growth are suppliedin the  
form oftradecredit．China supposedlyhas a problemwith financialintermediation  
duetothebarriersinvolvedin a七ransitionaleconomy，SuChas dealingwith acompany  
SyStem，aCCOunting system，andpropertyrights．In spite ofthese barriers，China has  
achievedremarkable economic development．fIence，Weinfer fTOm China－s economic  
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SuCCeSSthat afinancingchannelotherthanbankborrowingplays animportantrolein  
achieving economic development．Ourinterest does notlieinthe realm ofcorporate  
financebutratherindevelopmentfinance．   
Previous studies have presented differingviews ontrade creditin China．One ofthe  
Views suggested was that trade credit enables the growth ofnon－State－OWnedfirms  
regardless ofhowlimitedtheiraccessistobankcredit．Thisviewconforms totheidea  
indevelopmentfinancethatusinganalternativefinancingchannelfacilitates economic  
developmentevenifthefinancialsystemisinadequate．Incontrast，anOtherviewargued  
thatafinancingchannelotherthanbankcreditisnottradecreditbutinformalfinancing  
based onterritorialconnection andbloodrelationship．Whatthese twoviewshavein  
COmmOnis theiruse offinancialchannels otherthanbankloans；however，differences  
lieinthefinancialchannelsthemselves．Furthermore，Studies onthe Chinese economy  
havepointedoutthatlargecompanieshavemisusedtradecreditandinvolvedintriangle  
debts．This particularview argues that state－OWnedfirms utilize trade credit more  
heavily．As described above，eXisting studies presentvarylngViews onthepositionof  
trade credit．  
The reasonwhythese differentviews existis because ofthe constraint of data．It  
is difficultto collect the financialdata ofnonlistedcompanies，andthe datausedby  
PreVious studiesarelimitedtothesubsetsofarea，industry，andcompanytypebecause  
SuCh data were collectedvia questionnaires orfieldsurveys．The analyticalmethods  
usedinthese studies have alimitationinpresenting abroadoverviewofthe data．It  
is doubtfulwhether exploring・the generalityby selecting a smallsubsetfrom avast  
POPulationpresents atrue picture．Hence，it canbe statedthat previous workshave  
CaPturedtradecreditinadifferentway．   
This studycollects the financialdataofnonlistedcompaniesfrom alarge database  
to obtainthe totalpicture oftrade credit．This examinationsynthesizes the different  
Views to obtainan accurate depiction ofthe actualfinancing conditionthat Chinese  
COrPOrationsconfront．   
The remainder ofthe paperis organized as follows．The next section confirms the  
definition and economicfunction oftrade credit．We thenintroduce the research area   
that covers trade credit．Additionally，a review ofprevious studies onthe financing  
OfChinese corporations highlights the differences amongthe observations．Section3  
PreSentS the details ofthe data and compares the data to revealcharacteristics ofthe  
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corporations・Section4discussesthescalesthatmeasurethedependenceoffirmson  




2．1 Position   
Trade creditis defined as the commercialcreditthatis extendedby suppliers．Let  
us assumethatafirmdoesnothaveenoughdisposablecashtopurchaserawmaterials  
orproductsinprocess・Thefirmraisesfundsforproductionandcommercialactivities  







foracquiringworkingcapitalinJapan．   
Some studies onfinancialtheoryhavesuggestedthattradecredithasthe advantage  
ofinformationproduction・Asubstantialactivityoffinancialinstitutions entails  
resoIvinginformationproblemsbetweenalenderandaborrowerbymeansofefficient  
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financialinstitutionsassuppliershaveasimilarfunction．   
This economicfunction oftrade credittakes on differentmeaningsinthe contextof  
economic development．Trade creditis avitalfinancingmethod，Which complements  
banklending and supplies the funds necessary for economic growthin developlng  
COuntries w‡1ere the financialsystemis not mature．Information productionis  
advantageousinexplainingwhytradecreditbecomesanalternativefinancingconduitin  
CaSeSWhereleg・alandaccountingsystemsofdeveloplngeCOnOmiesareweak．   
Researchesin economic g・rowth，for example，theview expressedbyLaPorta et al．  
（1999），have suggestedthatnotonlycapital，1abor，andtechnologybut alsothelevelof  
institutionalcapabilitycouldcontributetoeconomicdevelopment．Researchersconsider  
afinancialsystem as one ofthe aspects ofinstitutionalcapacity．Theimprovementof  
institutionsbringsineconomicgrowth．Theseimprovementsincludefinancialdeepening，  
the development ofa stock market，the establishmentofan accounting systemforthe  
financialinfrastruCture，eStablishedpropertyrights，andlegalenforcement．   
The economic development ofChinais an apparent counter example ofthis view，  




Credit．Some studies explainthat trade credit mitigates the problems ofinadequate  
institutionsandconstraintsonbanklending．   
To sum up，trade credit has alternative or complementary relations with bank  
Credit andis animportantfinancingchannelincircumstances where theinformation  
PrOblemis severe or contract fulfillmentis uncertain．This studyinvestigates trade  
Credit，althoughourinterestisnotlimitedtothefinancingpattern．We exploretrade  
Creditfromthebroaderviewpointoftherelationshipbetweeneconomic growthandthe  
financialsystem．  
2．2 Previous studies  
Some studies point out the Chinese economy－s high growth，While other studies  
COnSiderfinancinginChinatobe aproblem．Here，WeeXPlorerecentstudiesrelatedto  
OureXaminationandconfirmhowprevious studies understandthefinancingpatternin  
Chinesecorporations．  





COnneCtion andbloodrelationships resultedin the growthofSMEs．Itis difficult to  
utilize even trade credit，1et alone financingfrom the capitalmarket andbanks．Ji  
reportedthefactthatSMEsprocurefundsfromfamily，friends，andundergroundbanks．   
Wang（2003）studied29state－OWnedfirmsinShandongProvinteandobservedthatthe  
financingstructureofthefirmsdifferedaccordingtothefirm，sassetsize．Althoughthis  
Studyis not acomparative analysis between state－OWned andnon－State－OWnedfirms，  
Wangpointed outthevaryingfinancing structures amongthe state－OWnedfirms．The  
focus ofthe studywas nottrade creditbut explainingthe factors ofbankborrowing，  
anditconcentratedonfinancing structures andnottherole ofthe financialsystemin  
developlngCOuntries．   
GeandQiu（2007）investigatedtradecreditinChinaandcomparedstate－OWnednrms  
to non・State－OWned鼠rmsinterms ofthe utilization oftrade credit and showedthat non－   
State－OWnedfirmsutilizedtradecreditmoreheavi1y．Inaddition，theyobservedthatthe  
mainpurpose ofutilizingtrade creditis notpurchase and salebutfundprocurement．  
These observations demonstratedthat Chinesecorporationsraisefundsfromfinancing  
Channelsotherthanfinancialinstitutionseventhoughtbefinancialsectorisweak．   
However，thereisalsoastudythatdemonstratedanexpansionoftradecreditforstate－  
OWnedfirms：Watanabe（2006）arguedthat acommonfactorbehindvariousphenomena  
Observedin China，SuChasundercapitalizedcorporations，triangle debts，andexcessive  
investments，WaStheremainingcontrolrights ofthe governmentoncorporations．She  
investigatedthetradecreditofthecoalminingindustryinHunanProvince．Theresults  
Ofthis studyindicatedthe expansionoftrade creditfor state－OWnedfirms，Whichhave  
Closer relations with the centralgovernment．She suggestedthatthis problem was  
PrObablytheresultoftheconventionalmethodoffinancingaccountspayable．   
Furthermore，Ji（2006）alsoreportedontriangle debts．Althoughtrade creditis the  
mostcommon且nancingchannelamongSMEs，thedelinquencyanddefaultofcommercial  
Credit are escalating andmanifestinginto a socialproblem．Therefore，aSindicatedby  
allreports，the number ofcorporationsthatrequire settlementincashforcommercial  
transactionsisincreasing．   
From the existing studies，We Can Observe two common features ofthe financing  
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PatternOfChinesecorporations．First，mOStOfthefundsinthe creditmarket arelent  
to state－OWnedfirms andlarge companies．Above all，theloans offourlarge state－  
OWnedbanksplace disproportionateweightonthe companies，Whichaffiliatedwiththe  
government．   
Second，PrlVate COmPanies havelimited access to the capitalmarket as wellas  
bank credit．The first and second features arelike two sides of a coin．Thelimited  
accessis attributedtoweakinformationproductionfunctionsincludingscreening and  





Meanwhile，We find differentviews ontrade credit amongprevious studies．Ge and  
Qiu（2007）reportedthefactthatnon－State－OWnedfirmsutilizedtradecreditwhenfaced  
Withlimited access tobankcredit．Incontrast，Ji（2006）arguedthatnon－State－OWned  
firmsdependednotontradecreditbutoninformalfinancingextendedbyfriends，family，  
andundergroundbanks．Hence，tO SumuP thefirstpointofdifference，PrlOr Studies  
PreSenteddifferentoplnionsaboutthemain且nancingchannel．   
Thesecondpointofdifferencecanbeobservedinthe comparativeperspectiveofthe  
State－OWnedandnon－State－OWnedfirms．Watanabe（2006）observedthatthelargerstate－  
OWnedfirms，Whichhaveacloserrelationwiththecentralgovernment，dependedheavily  
Ontradecredit．However，Ge andQiu（2007）demonstratedthatnon－State－OWnedfirms  
alsoutilizedtradecreditheavily．Thesetwostudiespresentedopposingoplnions．   
Howdoweevaluatethedifferencesintheresearchfindingsontradecredit？Isthere  
SOmethingwrongln either ofthe studies？Is there any explanationthatunifies the  
differingviews？Inorderto answerthese questions，We eXamine twoissues．Thefirst  
issue，Which corresponds to the secondpoint ofdifference，is determining which of  
thetwotypes offirms■－－State－OWnedornon－State－OWnedfirms－utilizestradecredit  
more heavily．The secondissueis determininghowtradecreditis distributed among  
non－State－OWnedfirms，andthe answerofthis questionwillresolvethefirstpointof  
di拝e王・enCe．   
Investigating a smallsample asin the previous studies cannot provide an answer，  
ThisisbecauseanalyzlngaSmallsubgroupofdatafromapopulationproducesdiverglng  




3．Overview ofthe data  
Inthis section，WePreSentthe overviewofthe dataforinvestigation．We obtainthe  
．financialdatafromtheonlinedatabaseQin，WhichisprovidedbyBureauvanDijk．Qin  
includes鋭nanCialinformationofabout300，0001istedandnon■1istedcorporations．These  
COrPOrate data are suppliedbythe SinoRating division ofthe China Export＆Credit  
Insurance Corporation（SinoSure）．SinoSureis alarge creditinsurance corporation  
thatspecializesinthe Chinese economy．Moreover，World一－VestBaseInc．contributed  
additionalinformationoflistedcompaniesforthisdatabase．   
Byusingdatafrom Qin，We Caninvestigatewhetherprevious studiesthatusedsmall  
SamPleshave generality．Thisisbecause our sampleincludes comprehensive data of  
nonNlistedcompaniesandcoversthewholeofChina．Nostudyinthepasthasattempted  
acorporateanalysisbyusingQin．   
Thedatasetincludes21，141corporations；Ofthese，18，897corporations arenon－State－  
ownedfirms，While2，244are state－OWnedfirmsl．Following GeandQiu（2007），Our  
SamPle excludeslistedcompanies andjoint companies．Listedcompanies canprocure  
fundsfromthestockmarket，andjointcompanieshaveaccesstooverseasfunds．These  













Criteria，18，897鮎msremain且nally．Wedemonstratethesearchcriteriaofthe databasetopreserve  
reproducibilitybyotherresearchers．  




Grossmargln：PerCentageOfgrossprofittosalesinfiscalyear2005   
When we examine the differences ofvariables between groups，itisimportantto  
COnSider whether avariableis distributednormally．In general，Weinvestigate the  
mean difference betweentwoindependent groupsbyusing a t－teSt．However，uSing  
a parametric test such as a t－teSt requires a normaldistribution ofvariables as a  
Prerequisite．  
Tablel：Summarystatistics   
Non－State－OWned  State－OWned  
median normality median normality p－Value  
1n（Sales）  11．3  
Ln（Asset）  10．8  
Ln（Employee）  5．5  
Salesgrow仏  27．3  
Grossma柑1n  lO．5  
No．ofsample  18897  
19．5☆☆  11．7  
14．5☆☆  12．1  
12．1☆☆  6．4  
17．3☆☆  17．9  
19．4☆☆  13．5  
2244  
12．7☆☆  0．00  
8．7☆☆  0．00  
8．2☆☆  0．00  
12．8☆☆  0．00  
11．7☆☆  0．00  
Note：Theasterisk＊denotesslgnificantatl％1evel．   
WetestthenormalityofthedistributionfortherespectivevariableswiththeShaplrO－  
Wilk test．In the table，the column ofnormality demonstrates the results ofthe  
examinations．Theresultsdonotsupportnormaldistribution．Hence，Wedeterminethe  
mean differencewiththeWilcoxonrank－SumteSt，Whichis anon－Parametrictest．The  
P－Valuecolumnshowsthetestresults．Weobserveslgnificantdifferencesbetweenstate－  
ownedandnon－State－OWnedfirmsforallvariables．   
An overview ofthe datareveals that state－OWnedfirms arebiggerthannon－State－  
OWnedfirmsintermsofvariables ofsales，tOtalasset，numberofemployees，andgross  
margln．Meanwhile，nOn－State－OWnedfirms show ahigher growthofsales than state－  
ownedfiI・mS．  
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4．Comparativeanalyses  
4．1 Choice ofscales  
Wetentativelyusetwo scalesthatmeasuretheutilizationoftrade credit．One scale  
isobtainedbydividingtheamountofaccountspayablebytotalasset（accountspayable／  
totalasset）whilethe otheris obtainedbydividingthe amountofaccountspayableby  
Sales（accountspayable／sales）．Bothscales arepresentedinterms ofpercentages．The  
useofthesescalesfollowspriorstudies．Fismanetal．（2003）investigatedtherelations  
betweentradecredit andindustrygrowthbyemployingthe scale ofaccountspayable／  
totalasset．Tsuruta（2007），Whohas studiedSMEsinJapan，dividedaccountspayable  
bytotalasset andsales．Watanabe（2006）usedsalesforthenormalizationofthedata，  
While GeandQiu（2007）usedtotalassetandsales．Ourstudyusesascaleobtainedby  
dividingaccountspayablebybothtotalassetandsalestoensureconsistencywithprior  
works．  
We compare state－OWned and non－State－OWned firms byindustry．Itis widely  
COnSidered that the features ofthe market structure and products affect a firm，s  
dependence on trade credit．The followinglS an eXamPle ofhow a product feature  
enhances the utilization oftrade credit．Anindustrythat tends to hold a versatile  
inventoryofrawmaterialsdependsonmoretradecredit．Itiseasyforthatindustryto  
resellanddispose ofinventoryowingtothisversatility．Thus，the suppliercancollect  
receivablesbyseizingandresellinglnVentOrylnCaSeOfdefaultbytheindustry2・Fisman  
et al．（2003）investigated43countries and demonstratedthatthe utilization oftrade  
Credit differs byindustry．We also conduct comparative analyses that reflect these  
studies3．   
Industrialclassification employs the first two digits ofthe StandardIndustrial  
Classification（SIC）codeusedinChina．Ourexaminationcovers27industrieswhichis  
therequiredsamplesizeforstatisticaltests．Table2comparestwoscalesconcerningthe  
useofaccountspayable．Thevaluesofthetwoscales aremediansforbothstate－OWned  
andnonEState－OWnedfirms．Apreliminarycheckis conducted usingthe ShaplrO－Wilk  
testwithnormaldistribution．We employ a medianwhere thevariableslacknormal  
distribution．  
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Table2：Comparisonsoftradecredit  （unit：％）  
accountspayable／totalasset accountspayable／sales  No．ofsample  
industryn慧慧e．慧…ふ  p－Value n慧慧e‾ 霊慧 p－Value non－State  
6  3．9  4．6  0．37  
???????????????????????????????????? ?? ??
??
7  7．2  11．8  0．45  8．4  13．3  0．23  





45  2．5  2．6  0．84  3．4  5．1  
46  1．3  0．35  0．07  4．1  1．8  
Note：Dottedareasstandforslgnincantresults．   
Table2showsamarkeddifferenceofresultsbetweenthescales．Wecanpointouttwo  
differences：Oneisadifferenceinthetestresults．TheWilcoxonrank－SumteStPrOduces  
five slgnificant results for the scale ofaccounts payable／totalasset andseventeen  
Slgnificantresults forthe scaleofaccountspayable／sales．Theother differenceisthe  
adverse changeofmagnituderelationby scales．Usinga different scale enlarges the  
－ 10 －   
TradeCreditofChineseCorporations：AComparativeAnalysis－Yamaguchi  
differenceinsomecases．Thefirms containingindustrycodes8，10，13，and14arethe  
CaSeSthathaveinvertedmagnituderelations．Thosewithindustrycodes6，9，and18are  
thecasesinwhichthedifferencewidensduetoascaleemployedforcomparison．Geand  
Qiu（2007）didnotobserveanymarkeddifferencesbetweenthescales．   
The differingresults bythe scale employed are attributedto the differenceinthe  
Characteristicsofthefinancialconditions amongthe groups．Asfor state－OWnedfirms，  
thevalueofaccountspayable／salestendstobelargerthanthatofaccountspayable／total  
asset．Fromthe differences ofthetwo scales，We CanPreSume thatthetotalasset size  
is muchlargerthanthatofsales．Thevarious results bythe scales employedcanbe  
explainediftheratiooftotalassettosalesisdifferent．   
Hence，WeeXaminewhetherratiosaredifferentamongthe groups．Table3showsthe  




ian W ian W  
industry  industry 
n。n＿S state n。n＿S state  
???????????????
0．57  0．63  
0．61  1．08  
1．1  1．69  
0．58  1．04  
0．68  1．58  
0．43  0．89  
0．41  1．11  
0．92  1．78  
0．61  1．66  
0．43  1．97  
1．90  1．10  
1．38  2．20  
4．77  5．39   
???????????????
???????????
0．53  1．44  
1．21  1．64  
0．55  1．20  
0．38  1．12  
0．35  0．96  
0．32  0．48  
0．56  0．89  
0．83  1．59  
1．15  0．94  
0．59  1．18  
0．41  0．97  
0．39  1．80  
0．64  1．37  















As expected，State－OWned firms show higher ratios．However，firms withindustry  
codes16and26demonstratelower ratios．The differencesin ratios are generally  
COnSiderable andthegapsbetweenthegroups areeconomicallyslgnificant．Mostofthe  
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ratios for non－State－OWned firms areless than one．This resultindicates that the total  
assetsizeissmallerthansales．Ontheotherhand，manyratiosarelargerthanonefor  
State－OWnedfirms．Theresultshighlightthebignessofassetsizeofstate－OWnedfirms．   
We alsousethescaleofaccountspayable／salesbecauseusingtwo differentscalescan  
revealthecharacteristicsoffinancialstanding．Besides，WeuSethisscalebecausethe  
Shortageofworkingcapitalproduces ademandfortradecredit．Accountspayable／sales  
is an appropriate scalefor examiningtheutilizationoftradecreditbecausethe excess  
andde且ciencyofworkingcapitalarerelatedtosales．  
4．2 Results and discussion  
We revisit Table2andwe observe slgnificant differencesinthe utilizationoftrade  
Credit between state－OWned and nonqstate－OWned firmsin17industries out ofthe27  
industriesinvestigated．Outof17theindustries，14demonstratethatstate－OWnedfirms  
dependontradecreditmorethannon－State－OWnedfirmsdo4．   
The first agendaofourstudyisto determinewhichgroups utilizetrade creditmore  
heavily．Some．oftheprevious studiesconcludedthatnon－State－OWnedfirmsdependon  
tradecreditmoreheavily．However，afterinvestigatingalargersample，Wefindevidence  
tothe contrary．Thefinancingpattern，OnWhichnon義State－OWnedfirms dependmore  
thanstate－OWnedfirms，doesnotpreservethegeneralityallowingforthisresult．   
Furthermore，theresultsimplythatstate－OWnedfirmsexpandtradecreditexcessively  
insome cases．Table4demonstratesthedistributionshapesofaccountspayable／sales．  
Percentile points show distribution shapes because the variables are not normally  
distributed・NotethatTable4coverstheindustriesinTable2thatshowslgnificant  
differencesintheutilizationoftradecredit．Excessivehighvalues arescatteredatthe  
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Table4：Distributionofaccountspayable／sales  （unit：％）  
industry  5％point 25％point median 75％point 95％point  
non－State  O  O．2  1．9  9．5  29．6  
State  O  l．8  7．5  15．9  60．3  
nontstate  O  O  O．5  4．5  20．O  
State  O  l．2  3．8  11  44．4  
non－State  O  O  l．6  6．7  33．O  
State  O  l．5  5．2  13．8  22．7  
non－State  O  l．7  5．8  11．9  34．1  
State  l．1  5．1  11．3  16．3  34．1  
non－State  O  O．9  4．1  11  30.4 
State  O  5．8  11．4  17．1  32．5  
non－State  O  O．3  1．9  6．1  24．1  
State  O  l．7  8．2  23．3  70．2  
non－State  O  l．7  6．1  13  29．1  
State  O  4．9  10．6  19A  38．2  
non－State  O  l．3  5．1  11．6  27．5  
State  O  3．1  7．2  16．0  48．0  
non－State  O  2．7  7．6  15．0  34．1  
State  l．2  4．2  11．2  18．5  48．3  
non－State  O  l．2  5．9  15．9  45．8  
State  O  4．5  14．5  25．4  66．3  
non－State  O  O．3  3．4  11．2  34．1  
State  O．6  5．7  9．3  16．5  42．6  
non－State  O  O．5  2．7  9  26．7  
State  O  l．5  6．4  15．4  36．9  
non－State  O  O．4  6．6  17．2  41.4 
state  5．4  23．1  35．0  56．3  85．5  
non－State  O  O．2  3．5  10．4  26．8  
state  O．5  8．1  29．2  33．9  49．3   
The second agendais to determine howthe utilization oftrade creditfor non－State－  
OWnedfirmsis distributed．Table4shows the existence ofa corporation cluster with  
extremelylow utilization oftrade credit．The numeric values at the25％point for  
non－State・OWnedfirms are quite small．For example，We CannOtfindtheutilization of  
trade credit atthe25％pointinfirms withindustrycodes9andlO．Otherindustry  
classifications showlessthanl％utilization oftradecredit．  
Figureldepicts the situationofnon－State－OWnedfirms muchmoreintuitively．This  
figureisahistogramoftheutilizationoftradecreditbyfirmsinindustrycode6．Wefind  
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Non－State－OWned  State－OWned  
0  ●100  コロ0  ココ0 0  ■100  コロ0  ヨ］0  
Figurel：Comparisonofhistogram   
We summarize the comparative analysesin two points．First，the result does  
not support the viewthat non－StateqOWnedfirms utilize trade credit more heavily．  
Comparative analysesbyindustry showthat state－OWnedfirms showhighvalues of  
utilizationinmostindustries．   
Triangledebts，aSPOintedoutbyWatanabe（2006），mOStlikelyexplainthehighvalue  
for state－OWnedfirms．Trade creditis expandedbyfollowingthe complexcommercial  
rules：delayedpaymentstosuppliers，COmPellingtradecredittomeetfinancingdemand，  
andhesitance topayinthefirstplace．The extremelyhighvalues atthe95％point  
observedinTable4inferthese situations．   
The otherfactor gtates thatitis easyforstate－OWnedfirms to procuretrade credit  
fromsuppliers．Tradecreditbringsaboutthesameeffectasborrowingbyextendingthe  
Payment datefor materials andproductspurchased．The supplier－s account executives  
and accountingpersonnelrequire a screeningofcreditriskto ensurethe collection of  
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receivables．Trade credit andbankcreditrequirethe samelevelofscreening；however，  
nonLState－OWned firms have a disadvantagein terms of screening．Although more  
than25years have passed since the reform and openingup ofthe economy，disfavor  
towardnon－State－OWnedfirmsis stillprevalent．State－OWnedfirms are stillprotected  
bythe government while non－StateqOWned SMEs arein a disadvantageous position．  
Furthermore，the prejudice that SMEshave aprobleminterms ofthepoor qualityof  
management andfinancialstatements，discretionaldebtrepayment，andlowcredibility  
Widely prevails．Such negative notations about non－State－OWned firms make the  
Obtainingofcreditdifficult．   
The highutilizationoftrade creditbystate・OWnedfirmsis convincinginthelightof  
triangledebts andtheincredibilityofnon－State－OWnedfirms．Thus，thehighutilization  
Oftradecreditbynon－State－OWnedfirms，WhichisobservedinGeandQiu（2007），isnot  
ageneralcase．Suchacasecapturesacorporatebehaviorundercircumstancesinwhich  
certainconditions are met．  
Second，informalfinancing channels rather than trade credit complement the  
financing・ofnon－State－OWnedfirms．One grouplnParticularutilizeslittletradecredit，  
as showninTable4andFigurel．We cannot assume thatthis group finances capital  
demandthoroughbankloan allowingforthe situationwhere bankcreditis availedby  
State－OWnedfirms．Inthatcase，the observedresultsthe support aviewthatinformal  
financingchannelsflourishasarguedbyJi（2006）．Theexplanationthatborrowingfrom  
family，friends，andundergroundbanks complementsfinancinglS COnSistentwiththe  
situationofnon－State－OWnedfirms．   
One factor that accounts for the dependence oninformalfinancing・channelsis  
asymmetricinformation．Bank borrowingis difficult to availofbecause ofsevere  
information problems．The combination ofindiscriminate financialstatements，  
ambiguous propertyrights，andlack ofscreening skills exacerbate the asymmetryof  
PrlOrinformation．Moreover，theborrowedfundsareinvestedinotherfirmsafteraloan  
is executed．To alarge extent，mOnitoringtoconfirmthewi11ing・neSS and endeavor of  
repaymentarenotconducted．   
Next，SuPPliers have more advantagesin terms ofinformation production than do  
financialinstitutions because suppliers can easily access their customers．Thisis  
because suppliers can obtaininformation about business conditionsin day－tO－day  
OPerations．However，therulesoftradecreditarecomplexasobservedincasesofsevere  




information．They arein a position to determine whether a borroweris credible；  
moreover，the borrower does not repay because thelenders and borrowers have a  
Closerelationship・Besides，disciplineachievedbysocialnorms，Wherebymaintaining  
One’s reputation ensures the fulfillment ofthe obligation，affects the alleviation of  
theinformationproblem．Informalfinancingchannelshave differentmechanismsfor  
resoIvinginformationproblems fromthefinancialinstitution，sfunctionofinformation  
PrOduction．Thus，Creditsupplyforgrowthisgrantedbywayofrelationshipratherthan  
trade credit．  
Throughprevious studiesandourresults，theviewthatnon－State－OWnedfirmsutilize  
trade credit activelyto procure growthfunds doesnot explainthe generalfinancing  
PatternOfChinesecorporations．Firmsthatutilizelittletradecreditdoexist；mOreOVer，  
there are manyfirms thatuseinformalfinancingchannels・Thisview depicts the  
realityofcorporatefinanceinChina．Moreover，theChineseeconomylSCOnfrontingthe  
PrOblem ofstate－OWnedfirms，heavydependence ontrade credit，Whichindicatestheir  
invoIvementintriangledebts．  
5． Conclusions   
Thisstudyveri且esthevariousviewsonthetradecreditofChinesecorporations．We  





results．   
First，theresults donotsupporttheviewthatnon－State－OWnedfirmsshowahigher  
utilization oftrade credit．The results ofthe comparison byindustry revealthe  
industriesinwhichstate－OWnedfirms dependontradecreditmoreheavily．Triangle  
debts andthelowcredibilityofnon－State－OWnedfirms aretheprobable causes ofthe  
differingfinancingpatterns．   
Second，nOn－State－OWnedfirmswhoexperiencedifficultywithbankborrowinggenerally  
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donotutilizetrade creditas acomplementaryfinancingchannel・Theutilizationof  
trade creditillustrates the existence ofnon＋State－OWned firms that utilizelittle trade  
credit．Thus，WeCanCOnSiderthesefirmsasdependentoninformalnnancingchannels・  
ThisfinancingpatternisexplainedbyamechanismthatisequlPPedwithinformal  
financingchannelsforresolvinginformationproblems・   
These results conclude that non－State－OWnedfirms do notheavily depend ontrade  
credit．Ageneralview，Whichprevailsintherealmofdevelopmentfinance，doesnot  
haveexplanatorypower・Phenomenasuchasarrearsofstate－OWnedfirms，COmPlexru1es  
ofcommercialcredit，andcomplementaryinformalfinancingchannels arethereality  
thattheChineseeconomyisfacing，andwecannotdrawacompletepictureofcorporate  






firms．Financingproblems arequitecapableofconstrainingthedevelopmentofthe  
Chineseeconomy，Whichiswitnessingremarkablegrowth・Thus，WeShouldclosely  










6  Coal mining 
7  Crudepetroleumandnaturalgasexploration  
8  Ferrous meta1   
9  Non－ferrousmetaloremining  
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10   Non－metallicoremining  
ll Mining  
13  Farmproductsandbyproductprocessing  
14   Foodmanufacturing  
15  Brewery  
16   Tobaccoproducts  
17   Textileindustry  
18  Garment，footwearandheadgearmanufacturing  
20   Timberprocessingandwoodproducts  
22   Paper－makingandpaperproductindustry  
23   Printingandrecordmediumduplication  
25   Petroleumrefining  
26   Chemicalmaterialsandchemicalproductsmanufacturing  
27   Pharmaceuticalmanufacturing  
29   Rubbermanufacturing  
31  Non－metallicmineralproducts  
32   Ferrousmetalsmelteringandrolling  
33   nonferrousmetalsmelteringandrolling  
36   SpecialequlPmentmanufacturing・  
37  TransportationequlPmentmanufacturing  
42  A工・tWOrks   
44   Electricity，fuelgasandwaterproductionandsupply  
45   Fuelgasproductionandsupply  
46 Water production and supply 
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